Open models, improved by agents
x0ne AI takes existing open-weight models and makes them better, release after release. AI agents curate data, fine-tune, evaluate and red-team; a human signs every release. Security is the flagship domain. General skills improve too, and never regress. It is a research project. Its question: can AI agents keep improving open models, continuously?
Open bases, made better
OLMo 3 first, Mistral next, any open-weights model through the base contract. Open weights, on-premise, first-class on x0ne OS.
Security first, not only
AI security, reverse engineering, pentest, detection and response, vulnerability analysis. Plus reasoning, code, instruction following and French.
Maintained by AI agents
An agent loop watches new open releases, curates, fine-tunes, evaluates and red-teams. A human signs off every release.
A variant ships only if it beats its base
- Better on its targets. It beats its base on its target domains, by at least the set margin.
- No general regression. No general benchmark drops below the base beyond the set tolerance.
- Human sign-off. A human signs the release. Agents never publish alone.
Margin and tolerance are pending. Base and variant are scored by the same public harness, in the same run.
Which open models we improve
One release family per base: x0ne/model-x-olmo3, x0ne/model-x-mistral. A base must allow redistributing derivatives.
| Base | Model | License | Training data | Family | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OLMo 3 | allenai/Olmo-3-7B-Instruct | Apache-2.0 | open (Dolma 3, Dolci) | x0ne/model-x-olmo3 | first |
| Mistral | next open-weights release; today Ministral 3 8B Instruct | Apache-2.0 | not published | x0ne/model-x-mistral | next |
| Any open-weights model | through the base contract | must allow derivatives | stated | x0ne/model-x-<base> | open |
The base contract
Every base is a file in spec/bases/. make intake checks it against Hugging Face metadata, without downloading weights.
hf_id
Hugging Face model id.revision
Pinned commit. No moving target.license
License id, and whether derivatives may be redistributed.chat_template
Format and file, carried into GGUF.architecture
Family, class, size, context.gguf
Conversion path for llama.cpp and Ollama.
Why OLMo 3 first: weights and training data are open, so each improvement can be reproduced. Mistral Medium 3.5 is not a base: its modified MIT license withdraws rights above a revenue threshold, derivatives included.
One family per base
Each variant is its base, improved. Sizes follow the base. Same evals, same release rule.
- Base
- OLMo 3 7B Instruct
- Parameters
- ~7.3B dense
- Context
- 16K served
- GGUF Q4_K_M
- ~4.4 GB
- GGUF Q8_0
- ~7.8 GB
- RAM
- 16 GB
$ ollama run x0ne/model-x-olmo3:7b- Base
- Ministral 3 8B
- Parameters
- ~8.9B dense
- Context
- 16K served
- GGUF Q4_K_M
- ~5.4 GB
- GGUF Q8_0
- ~9.5 GB
- RAM
- 16 GB
$ ollama run x0ne/model-x-mistral:8b- Base
- passes the contract
- Intake
- metadata only
- License
- derivatives allowed
- Watched
- allenai, mistralai
$ make intake BASE=<id>Specs on this page are release targets. ollama run x0ne/model-x-olmo3 resolves to :7b. Commands work at release.
Security first. Not only security.
Each release targets domains. Security is the flagship. General skills must hold on every release, and improve when they are a target.
Offensive and defensive security
- AI security: prompt injection, jailbreaks, agent and tool abuse
- Reverse engineering: assembly, binaries, decompilation
- Pentest methodology, scoped and authorized
- Detection and response: logs, rules, timelines
- Vulnerability analysis: CVE, CWE, code review
- Refusal policy and safe alternatives
Every offensive answer comes with its detection and its fix.
Keep and grow the base
- Reasoning and math
- Code
- Instruction following
- Multilingual, French included
Never regresses against the base.
Tutor for x0ne.training
- Hints that keep the student working
- Explains the concept, not the flag
- Lab-aware context
- Runs locally in class
Hint first.
Weights
GGUF for llama.cpp and Ollama, safetensors for Transformers and vLLM. Every file ships with its checksum and the eval report of its release.
- model-x-olmo3-7b-Q4_K_M.gguf~4.4 GBat release
- model-x-olmo3-7b-Q8_0.gguf~7.8 GBat release
- model-x-olmo3-7b/ (safetensors)BF16at release
Not released yet. A variant ships once it passes the release rule.
- model-x-mistral-8b-Q4_K_M.gguf~5.4 GBat release
- model-x-mistral-8b-Q8_0.gguf~9.5 GBat release
- model-x-mistral-8b/ (safetensors)BF16at release
Not released yet. A variant ships once it passes the release rule.
Specifications
Architecture, tokenizer and chat template are the base's. Fine-tuning changes the weights, not the layout.
| Base | Olmo-3-7B-Instruct |
|---|---|
| Class | Olmo3ForCausalLM |
| Parameters | ~7.3B, dense |
| Base context | 65,536 |
| Chat template | ChatML |
| Base license | Apache-2.0 |
| Base | Ministral-3-8B-Instruct-2512 |
|---|---|
| Class | Mistral3ForConditionalGeneration |
| Parameters | ~8.9B, dense, text and image |
| Base context | 262,144 |
| Chat template | Mistral |
| Base license | Apache-2.0 |
Read from the Hugging Face API on 2026-10-09. Served context is 16K by default; more context needs more RAM.
The agent loop
Can AI agents keep improving open models, continuously? This loop is the core of the project. It runs per base. Agents run every step. Nothing is published unless the variant beats its base, holds its general skills, and a human signs off.
- Curate data. Agents collect, filter and deduplicate domain data, and add the cases that failed last cycle.
- Fine-tune. LoRA fine-tuning and preference training on the open base.
- Evaluate. The public harness scores the variant and its base on every benchmark below.
- Red-team. Attacker agents try prompt injection, jailbreaks and misuse against the candidate.
- Gate. Beats the base on its targets, holds every general benchmark, and a human signs off. fail: nothing ships, back to 01
- Publish. Weights, eval report and changelog. New open bases and feedback start the next cycle.
Training stages and data mix
Four stages per release cycle, run by the agent loop on each base.
- STAGE 1
Knowledge injection
Domain corpora: security write-ups, advisories, documentation, assembly.LoRA · domain text - STAGE 2
Instruction tuning
Tasks, tool use, step-by-step methodology.LoRA SFT · chat format - STAGE 3
Preference and refusal
Helpful on authorized work, firm on misuse.DPO · refusal pairs - STAGE 4
Red-team hardening
Train on what the attacker agents broke.adversarial SFT · re-eval
| Domain | Share | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AI security | Prompt injection, jailbreaks, LLM red teaming, agent and tool abuse | |
| Reverse engineering | x86-64 and ARM assembly, binaries, decompilation | |
| Pentest methodology | Recon to report, web, network, Active Directory | |
| Detection and IR | Logs, detection rules, triage, incident timelines | |
| Vulnerability analysis | CVE and CWE analysis, code review, patch diffing | |
| Teaching | Tutoring on x0ne.training labs: hints, not answers | |
| Refusal and safety | Misuse requests, scope checks, safe alternatives | |
| General replay | General reasoning, to keep base skills |
Shares are targets. The split between security, general and teaching is pending. Sample counts and sources are published in the data card of each release.
Security, in depth
What each release targets first. Offensive and defensive, for authorized work and teaching.
Attack and defend LLMs
- Prompt injection and jailbreak detection
- LLM red teaming plans and payload review
- Agent and tool abuse analysis
- Guardrail and system prompt review
Reverse engineering
- Read and explain assembly
- Annotate disassembly and decompiled code
- Crackme and binary walkthroughs
- Calling conventions, stack, syscalls
Pentest methodology
- Scoped engagement plans
- Enumeration and next-step reasoning
- Finding write-ups and report drafts
- Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK
Detection and response
- Log triage and timelines
- Detection rule drafting (Sigma, YARA)
- Incident response playbooks
- Alert explanation for analysts
Vulnerability analysis
- CVE and CWE explanation
- Secure code review
- Patch diff analysis
- Severity and exploitability reasoning
Defense first
- Detection and fix with every offensive answer
- Refuses unauthorized targeting
- Says why, offers a safe alternative
- Scope checks before action
Who it is for
Triage alerts and draft detections without sending logs outside.
Plan, enumerate and write up an authorized engagement.
Test LLM apps and agents for injection and tool abuse.
Rerun the evals, compare each variant with its open base.
A tutor for labs, on a laptop, in class.
Benchmarks
Public benchmarks, run by the public eval harness on every release, on the variant and on its base. Each score is published next to its base score. A variant that does not beat its base, or regresses on general skills, does not ship.
Security flagship · must beat the base
| Benchmark | Measures | olmo3:7b | mistral:8b |
|---|---|---|---|
| CyberSecEval 3 | Prompt injection, code interpreter abuse, offensive capability (Meta) | pending | pending |
| HarmBench | Robust refusal under automated red teaming | pending | pending |
| JailbreakBench | Jailbreak robustness | pending | pending |
| AgentDojo | Prompt injection against tool-using agents | pending | pending |
| CTIBench | Cyber threat intelligence | pending | pending |
| CyberMetric | Cybersecurity knowledge, multiple choice | pending | pending |
| Cybench | Professional CTF tasks, agentic | pending | pending |
| NYU CTF Bench | CTF challenges, offensive security | pending | pending |
| WMDP-Cyber | Hazardous cyber knowledge, tracked as a ceiling | pending | pending |
| x0ne labs | In-house: assembly and security labs from x0ne.training, published with the harness | pending | pending |
General must not regress
| Benchmark | Measures | olmo3:7b | mistral:8b |
|---|---|---|---|
| MMLU-Pro | Knowledge and reasoning, 14 subjects | pending | pending |
| GSM8K | Grade-school math word problems | pending | pending |
| IFEval | Verifiable instruction following | pending | pending |
| HumanEval | Python code from docstrings | pending | pending |
| MBPP | Basic Python programming problems | pending | pending |
| FrenchBench | French understanding and generation (CroissantLLM paper) | pending | pending |
No score is published before a release passes the gate. Thresholds, margin and tolerance are pending.
Quickstart
Ollama for the shortest path, Transformers for research, any OpenAI-compatible client for apps.
$ ollama pull x0ne/model-x-olmo3:7b $ ollama run x0ne/model-x-olmo3:7b "Explain: push rbp; mov rbp, rsp"
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer model_id = "x0ne/model-x-olmo3-7b" tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id) model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(model_id, torch_dtype="auto", device_map="auto") messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Is this a prompt injection? ..."}] inputs = tok.apply_chat_template(messages, add_generation_prompt=True, return_tensors="pt").to(model.device) out = model.generate(inputs, max_new_tokens=512) print(tok.decode(out[0][inputs.shape[-1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))
from openai import OpenAI # Ollama serves an OpenAI-compatible API on port 11434. No data leaves the machine. client = OpenAI(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1", api_key="ollama") r = client.chat.completions.create( model="x0ne/model-x-mistral:8b", messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Draft a Sigma rule for ..."}], temperature=0.4, ) print(r.choices[0].message.content)
Example prompts
This RAG answer contains a hidden instruction. Find it and explain how it reached the context.
Review these tool definitions. Which one lets an injected prompt exfiltrate data?
Annotate this disassembly line by line and name the algorithm.
Authorized test, scope attached. Nmap output below: what do I enumerate next, and why?
Build a timeline from these auth logs and say where the intrusion starts.
I am stuck on lab 3. Give me a hint, not the answer.
Explique en trois phrases ce que fait ce script, puis propose un test.Solve step by step, then check your answer against the units.
Write the function from this docstring, then a unit test for the edge case.
How model-x answers security questions
- AnalysisWhat is happening, from the evidence given.
- EvidenceThe lines, offsets or log entries it relies on.
- ActionsNext steps, ordered, within the stated scope.
- ReferencesATT&CK, CWE and CVE identifiers when they apply.
Short questions get short answers. Teaching mode answers with a hint first.
Default parameters
| Parameter | olmo3:7b | mistral:8b | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| temperature | 0.6 | 0.6 | Lower (0.2 to 0.4) for detection rules and code |
| top_p | 0.9 | 0.9 | Nucleus sampling |
| top_k | 40 | 40 | Candidate tokens per step |
| repeat_penalty | 1.1 | 1.1 | Long disassembly listings repeat by nature |
| num_ctx | 16384 | 16384 | Served context; the base allows more, more context needs more RAM |
| num_predict | 2048 | 2048 | Maximum tokens per answer |
Everything a release needs to be checked
Base model, training stages, limits, intended use.
Base contracts: pinned revision, license, chat template.
Data mix by domain, sources, licenses, filtering.
The eval harness, public. Anyone can rerun the scores.
Each agent-made release: run, delta vs base, human sign-off.
| Date | Version | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-09 | — | Project started. |
| 2026-10-09 | — | Reframed: agents improve existing open models, OLMo 3 first, Mistral next. Security stays the flagship domain. |
Offensive knowledge, used with authorization
- Authorized testing and education. Offensive knowledge is for systems you own or are allowed to test, and for teaching.
- Refusal policy. model-x refuses to target systems without authorization, to build malware for deployment, or to harm people. It says why and offers a safe alternative.
- Defense first. Every offensive answer comes with its detection and its fix.
- Responsible disclosure. Found a vulnerability, or a way to jailbreak model-x? Write to contact@x0ne.co. Fixes land in the next release.
- Human sign-off. Agents never publish alone. A human signs every release.
- Limits stated. model-x can be wrong. Verify findings before acting on them.
Questions
Can I download model-x today?
Not yet. model-x is a research preview. The commands and files on this page work from the first release.
What does "maintained by AI agents" mean?
Agents run the full cycle: watching new open releases, data curation, fine-tuning, evaluation and red teaming. A release ships only if it beats its base, holds its general skills, and a human signs off.
Is it only a security model?
No. Security is the flagship domain. General skills (reasoning, code, instruction following, French) are improved too, and a release that regresses on them does not ship.
Which base models?
OLMo 3 first (allenai/Olmo-3-7B-Instruct, Apache-2.0): its weights and training data are open, so each improvement can be reproduced. Mistral next, on its next open-weights release. Any open-weights model can become a base if it passes the base contract.
Does it run without internet?
Yes. Weights run locally with Ollama, llama.cpp, Transformers or vLLM.
Will it help attack systems?
For authorized testing and education, yes, with detection and fix alongside. Otherwise it refuses. See responsible use.
How does it relate to x0ne OS and x0ne.training?
model-x is first-class on x0ne OS, and its teaching mode is a tutor for x0ne.training labs.