Research preview · specs are release targets

x0ne/model-x

AI agents that continuously improve existing open models. Security first, offensive and defensive, without losing general skills: reasoning, code, instruction following, French and other languages. One release family per open base, OLMo 3 first, Mistral next, run on your own machines.

  • Text Generation
  • base OLMo 3 · Mistral
  • cybersecurity
  • ai-security
  • general
  • multilingual
  • red-teaming
  • reverse-engineering
  • GGUF
  • Safetensors
  • Ollama
Model card

Open models, improved by agents

x0ne AI takes existing open-weight models and makes them better, release after release. AI agents curate data, fine-tune, evaluate and red-team; a human signs every release. Security is the flagship domain. General skills improve too, and never regress. It is a research project. Its question: can AI agents keep improving open models, continuously?

Open bases, made better

OLMo 3 first, Mistral next, any open-weights model through the base contract. Open weights, on-premise, first-class on x0ne OS.

Security first, not only

AI security, reverse engineering, pentest, detection and response, vulnerability analysis. Plus reasoning, code, instruction following and French.

Maintained by AI agents

An agent loop watches new open releases, curates, fine-tunes, evaluates and red-teams. A human signs off every release.

Release rule

A variant ships only if it beats its base

  1. Better on its targets. It beats its base on its target domains, by at least the set margin.
  2. No general regression. No general benchmark drops below the base beyond the set tolerance.
  3. Human sign-off. A human signs the release. Agents never publish alone.

Margin and tolerance are pending. Base and variant are scored by the same public harness, in the same run.

Bases

Which open models we improve

One release family per base: x0ne/model-x-olmo3, x0ne/model-x-mistral. A base must allow redistributing derivatives.

Bases · licenses read on the model cards, 2026-10-09
BaseModelLicenseTraining dataFamilyStatus
OLMo 3allenai/Olmo-3-7B-InstructApache-2.0open (Dolma 3, Dolci)x0ne/model-x-olmo3first
Mistralnext open-weights release; today Ministral 3 8B InstructApache-2.0not publishedx0ne/model-x-mistralnext
Any open-weights modelthrough the base contractmust allow derivativesstatedx0ne/model-x-<base>open

The base contract

Every base is a file in spec/bases/. make intake checks it against Hugging Face metadata, without downloading weights.

  • hf_id
    Hugging Face model id.
  • revision
    Pinned commit. No moving target.
  • license
    License id, and whether derivatives may be redistributed.
  • chat_template
    Format and file, carried into GGUF.
  • architecture
    Family, class, size, context.
  • gguf
    Conversion path for llama.cpp and Ollama.

Why OLMo 3 first: weights and training data are open, so each improvement can be reproduced. Mistral Medium 3.5 is not a base: its modified MIT license withdraws rights above a revenue threshold, derivatives included.

Variants

One family per base

Each variant is its base, improved. Sizes follow the base. Same evals, same release rule.

x0ne/model-x-olmo3:7b
First family · laptop and workstation
Base
OLMo 3 7B Instruct
Parameters
~7.3B dense
Context
16K served
GGUF Q4_K_M
~4.4 GB
GGUF Q8_0
~7.8 GB
RAM
16 GB
$ ollama run x0ne/model-x-olmo3:7b
x0ne/model-x-mistral:8b
Next family · rebased on the next Mistral release
Base
Ministral 3 8B
Parameters
~8.9B dense
Context
16K served
GGUF Q4_K_M
~5.4 GB
GGUF Q8_0
~9.5 GB
RAM
16 GB
$ ollama run x0ne/model-x-mistral:8b
x0ne/model-x-<base>
Any open-weights base
Base
passes the contract
Intake
metadata only
License
derivatives allowed
Watched
allenai, mistralai
$ make intake BASE=<id>

Specs on this page are release targets. ollama run x0ne/model-x-olmo3 resolves to :7b. Commands work at release.

Domains

Security first. Not only security.

Each release targets domains. Security is the flagship. General skills must hold on every release, and improve when they are a target.

Flagship · security

Offensive and defensive security

  • AI security: prompt injection, jailbreaks, agent and tool abuse
  • Reverse engineering: assembly, binaries, decompilation
  • Pentest methodology, scoped and authorized
  • Detection and response: logs, rules, timelines
  • Vulnerability analysis: CVE, CWE, code review
  • Refusal policy and safe alternatives

Every offensive answer comes with its detection and its fix.

General

Keep and grow the base

  • Reasoning and math
  • Code
  • Instruction following
  • Multilingual, French included

Never regresses against the base.

Teaching

Tutor for x0ne.training

  • Hints that keep the student working
  • Explains the concept, not the flag
  • Lab-aware context
  • Runs locally in class

Hint first.

Files and versions

Weights

GGUF for llama.cpp and Ollama, safetensors for Transformers and vLLM. Every file ships with its checksum and the eval report of its release.

model-x-olmo3-7b~7.3B · BF16
  • model-x-olmo3-7b-Q4_K_M.gguf~4.4 GBat release
  • model-x-olmo3-7b-Q8_0.gguf~7.8 GBat release
  • model-x-olmo3-7b/ (safetensors)BF16at release

Not released yet. A variant ships once it passes the release rule.

model-x-mistral-8b~8.9B · BF16
  • model-x-mistral-8b-Q4_K_M.gguf~5.4 GBat release
  • model-x-mistral-8b-Q8_0.gguf~9.5 GBat release
  • model-x-mistral-8b/ (safetensors)BF16at release

Not released yet. A variant ships once it passes the release rule.

Architecture

Specifications

Architecture, tokenizer and chat template are the base's. Fine-tuning changes the weights, not the layout.

model-x-olmo3:7b
BaseOlmo-3-7B-Instruct
ClassOlmo3ForCausalLM
Parameters~7.3B, dense
Base context65,536
Chat templateChatML
Base licenseApache-2.0
model-x-mistral:8b
BaseMinistral-3-8B-Instruct-2512
ClassMistral3ForConditionalGeneration
Parameters~8.9B, dense, text and image
Base context262,144
Chat templateMistral
Base licenseApache-2.0

Read from the Hugging Face API on 2026-10-09. Served context is 16K by default; more context needs more RAM.

Research question

The agent loop

Can AI agents keep improving open models, continuously? This loop is the core of the project. It runs per base. Agents run every step. Nothing is published unless the variant beats its base, holds its general skills, and a human signs off.

Agent loop: curate data, fine-tune, evaluate against the base, red-team, release gate (beats the base, holds general benchmarks, human sign-off), publish. A failed gate goes back to curation; feedback from each release goes back to curation. feedback: new open bases, issues, new attacks → next cycle 01 curatedata 02 fine-tuneLoRA · DPO 03 evaluatevs the base 04 red-teamagent attacks 05 · gate beats baseholds general+ human sign-off 06 publish+ changelog fail: nothing ships, back to 01 with the failing cases
Every release is the output of one full cycle. The changelog records which agent run produced it and which human signed it.
  1. Curate data. Agents collect, filter and deduplicate domain data, and add the cases that failed last cycle.
  2. Fine-tune. LoRA fine-tuning and preference training on the open base.
  3. Evaluate. The public harness scores the variant and its base on every benchmark below.
  4. Red-team. Attacker agents try prompt injection, jailbreaks and misuse against the candidate.
  5. Gate. Beats the base on its targets, holds every general benchmark, and a human signs off. fail: nothing ships, back to 01
  6. Publish. Weights, eval report and changelog. New open bases and feedback start the next cycle.
Training

Training stages and data mix

Four stages per release cycle, run by the agent loop on each base.

  1. STAGE 1

    Knowledge injection

    Domain corpora: security write-ups, advisories, documentation, assembly.LoRA · domain text
  2. STAGE 2

    Instruction tuning

    Tasks, tool use, step-by-step methodology.LoRA SFT · chat format
  3. STAGE 3

    Preference and refusal

    Helpful on authorized work, firm on misuse.DPO · refusal pairs
  4. STAGE 4

    Red-team hardening

    Train on what the attacker agents broke.adversarial SFT · re-eval
Data mix · first cycle, security focus · target share
DomainShareCoverage
AI security
25%
Prompt injection, jailbreaks, LLM red teaming, agent and tool abuse
Reverse engineering
15%
x86-64 and ARM assembly, binaries, decompilation
Pentest methodology
15%
Recon to report, web, network, Active Directory
Detection and IR
15%
Logs, detection rules, triage, incident timelines
Vulnerability analysis
10%
CVE and CWE analysis, code review, patch diffing
Teaching
10%
Tutoring on x0ne.training labs: hints, not answers
Refusal and safety
5%
Misuse requests, scope checks, safe alternatives
General replay
5%
General reasoning, to keep base skills

Shares are targets. The split between security, general and teaching is pending. Sample counts and sources are published in the data card of each release.

Flagship domain

Security, in depth

What each release targets first. Offensive and defensive, for authorized work and teaching.

AI security

Attack and defend LLMs

  • Prompt injection and jailbreak detection
  • LLM red teaming plans and payload review
  • Agent and tool abuse analysis
  • Guardrail and system prompt review
Cybersecurity

Reverse engineering

  • Read and explain assembly
  • Annotate disassembly and decompiled code
  • Crackme and binary walkthroughs
  • Calling conventions, stack, syscalls
Cybersecurity

Pentest methodology

  • Scoped engagement plans
  • Enumeration and next-step reasoning
  • Finding write-ups and report drafts
  • Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK
Cybersecurity

Detection and response

  • Log triage and timelines
  • Detection rule drafting (Sigma, YARA)
  • Incident response playbooks
  • Alert explanation for analysts
Cybersecurity

Vulnerability analysis

  • CVE and CWE explanation
  • Secure code review
  • Patch diff analysis
  • Severity and exploitability reasoning
Safety

Defense first

  • Detection and fix with every offensive answer
  • Refuses unauthorized targeting
  • Says why, offers a safe alternative
  • Scope checks before action
Use cases

Who it is for

SOC analyst

Triage alerts and draft detections without sending logs outside.

security
Pentester

Plan, enumerate and write up an authorized engagement.

security
AI red teamer

Test LLM apps and agents for injection and tool abuse.

security
Researcher

Rerun the evals, compare each variant with its open base.

general · security
Student and teacher

A tutor for labs, on a laptop, in class.

teaching
Evaluation

Benchmarks

Public benchmarks, run by the public eval harness on every release, on the variant and on its base. Each score is published next to its base score. A variant that does not beat its base, or regresses on general skills, does not ship.

Security flagship · must beat the base

BenchmarkMeasuresolmo3:7bmistral:8b
CyberSecEval 3Prompt injection, code interpreter abuse, offensive capability (Meta)pendingpending
HarmBenchRobust refusal under automated red teamingpendingpending
JailbreakBenchJailbreak robustnesspendingpending
AgentDojoPrompt injection against tool-using agentspendingpending
CTIBenchCyber threat intelligencependingpending
CyberMetricCybersecurity knowledge, multiple choicependingpending
CybenchProfessional CTF tasks, agenticpendingpending
NYU CTF BenchCTF challenges, offensive securitypendingpending
WMDP-CyberHazardous cyber knowledge, tracked as a ceilingpendingpending
x0ne labsIn-house: assembly and security labs from x0ne.training, published with the harnesspendingpending

General must not regress

BenchmarkMeasuresolmo3:7bmistral:8b
MMLU-ProKnowledge and reasoning, 14 subjectspendingpending
GSM8KGrade-school math word problemspendingpending
IFEvalVerifiable instruction followingpendingpending
HumanEvalPython code from docstringspendingpending
MBPPBasic Python programming problemspendingpending
FrenchBenchFrench understanding and generation (CroissantLLM paper)pendingpending

No score is published before a release passes the gate. Thresholds, margin and tolerance are pending.

Usage

Quickstart

Ollama for the shortest path, Transformers for research, any OpenAI-compatible client for apps.

shell · Ollamaat release
$ ollama pull x0ne/model-x-olmo3:7b
$ ollama run x0ne/model-x-olmo3:7b "Explain: push rbp; mov rbp, rsp"
python · transformersat release
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer

model_id = "x0ne/model-x-olmo3-7b"
tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_id)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(model_id, torch_dtype="auto", device_map="auto")

messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Is this a prompt injection? ..."}]
inputs = tok.apply_chat_template(messages, add_generation_prompt=True, return_tensors="pt").to(model.device)
out = model.generate(inputs, max_new_tokens=512)
print(tok.decode(out[0][inputs.shape[-1]:], skip_special_tokens=True))
python · OpenAI-compatible API (Ollama, vLLM)at release
from openai import OpenAI

# Ollama serves an OpenAI-compatible API on port 11434. No data leaves the machine.
client = OpenAI(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1", api_key="ollama")
r = client.chat.completions.create(
    model="x0ne/model-x-mistral:8b",
    messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Draft a Sigma rule for ..."}],
    temperature=0.4,
)
print(r.choices[0].message.content)

Example prompts

AI securityThis RAG answer contains a hidden instruction. Find it and explain how it reached the context.
Agent abuseReview these tool definitions. Which one lets an injected prompt exfiltrate data?
Reverse engineeringAnnotate this disassembly line by line and name the algorithm.
PentestAuthorized test, scope attached. Nmap output below: what do I enumerate next, and why?
DetectionBuild a timeline from these auth logs and say where the intrusion starts.
TeachingI am stuck on lab 3. Give me a hint, not the answer.
General · FrenchExplique en trois phrases ce que fait ce script, puis propose un test.
General · reasoningSolve step by step, then check your answer against the units.
General · codeWrite the function from this docstring, then a unit test for the edge case.
Response format

How model-x answers security questions

  1. AnalysisWhat is happening, from the evidence given.
  2. EvidenceThe lines, offsets or log entries it relies on.
  3. ActionsNext steps, ordered, within the stated scope.
  4. ReferencesATT&CK, CWE and CVE identifiers when they apply.

Short questions get short answers. Teaching mode answers with a hint first.

Parameters

Default parameters

Parameterolmo3:7bmistral:8bNote
temperature0.60.6Lower (0.2 to 0.4) for detection rules and code
top_p0.90.9Nucleus sampling
top_k4040Candidate tokens per step
repeat_penalty1.11.1Long disassembly listings repeat by nature
num_ctx1638416384Served context; the base allows more, more context needs more RAM
num_predict20482048Maximum tokens per answer
Open and reproducible

Everything a release needs to be checked

MODEL_CARD.md

Base model, training stages, limits, intended use.

spec/bases/

Base contracts: pinned revision, license, chat template.

DATA_CARD.md

Data mix by domain, sources, licenses, filtering.

evals/

The eval harness, public. Anyone can rerun the scores.

CHANGELOG.md

Each agent-made release: run, delta vs base, human sign-off.

Changelog
DateVersionChange
2026-10-09—Project started.
2026-10-09—Reframed: agents improve existing open models, OLMo 3 first, Mistral next. Security stays the flagship domain.
Responsible use

Offensive knowledge, used with authorization

  • Authorized testing and education. Offensive knowledge is for systems you own or are allowed to test, and for teaching.
  • Refusal policy. model-x refuses to target systems without authorization, to build malware for deployment, or to harm people. It says why and offers a safe alternative.
  • Defense first. Every offensive answer comes with its detection and its fix.
  • Responsible disclosure. Found a vulnerability, or a way to jailbreak model-x? Write to contact@x0ne.co. Fixes land in the next release.
  • Human sign-off. Agents never publish alone. A human signs every release.
  • Limits stated. model-x can be wrong. Verify findings before acting on them.
FAQ

Questions

Can I download model-x today?

Not yet. model-x is a research preview. The commands and files on this page work from the first release.

What does "maintained by AI agents" mean?

Agents run the full cycle: watching new open releases, data curation, fine-tuning, evaluation and red teaming. A release ships only if it beats its base, holds its general skills, and a human signs off.

Is it only a security model?

No. Security is the flagship domain. General skills (reasoning, code, instruction following, French) are improved too, and a release that regresses on them does not ship.

Which base models?

OLMo 3 first (allenai/Olmo-3-7B-Instruct, Apache-2.0): its weights and training data are open, so each improvement can be reproduced. Mistral next, on its next open-weights release. Any open-weights model can become a base if it passes the base contract.

Does it run without internet?

Yes. Weights run locally with Ollama, llama.cpp, Transformers or vLLM.

Will it help attack systems?

For authorized testing and education, yes, with detection and fix alongside. Otherwise it refuses. See responsible use.

How does it relate to x0ne OS and x0ne.training?

model-x is first-class on x0ne OS, and its teaching mode is a tutor for x0ne.training labs.

Follow the research

Watch agents improve open models

Get the first release, the eval reports against each base, and each agent-made changelog. Write to us.

contact@x0ne.co